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BOOK REVIEW 
Economic Foundations of International Law. By Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes. 
Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. viii, 372. Index. $65. 
Timothy Meyer 
University of Georgia School of Law 
 Law has many goals: to express the values of a community, to change attitudes of 
its subjects, to structure their interactions, and to give them a language in which those 
interactions can occur. Law can legitimate particular conceptions of the general welfare 
and therefore provide the field on which groups motivated by self-interest and altruism 
alike compete for the attentions of others. Law can also define the obligations of the 
members of a polity to each other and, by creating mechanisms to encourage compliance 
with those obligations, change how its subjects behave.  
 
For many years, international law scholarship focused on some of these goals, to 
the exclusion of others. It paid relatively scant attention to how international law creates 
incentives for self-interested states to behave in particular ways and to how those 
incentives, in turn, structure the process of international lawmaking. The last ten years, 
however, have seen a reversal in this trend. At present, economic analysis of international 
law—an approach that assumes states rationally pursue their self-interest—is commonly 
featured in many of the leading international law journals.1 In Economic Foundations of 
International Law, Eric Posner, the Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of 
Law at the University of Chicago School of Law, and Alan Sykes, the Robert A. Kindler 
Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, provide what is, to date, the 
capstone of the economic analysis of international law. The book’s objective is “to gather 
together and build on many of the ideas” generated in the first decade or so of sustained 
economic analysis of international law and “to present them in a manner suitable as an 
introduction for students and as a reference work for scholars” (p. 3). The book seeks to 
provide “an intellectual framework” for thinking about international law and therefore 
“aims for breadth, not depth” (p. 4). The book is wildly successful in fulfilling these 
goals. Economic Foundations is destined to be both a starting point for much future 
research and a bridge between international legal scholars and political scientists working 
in international relations, who have long embraced a rational choice approach.  
 
The book is divided into five parts that proceed from the general to the specific. 
Part I (chapters 1–3), entitled “Basics,” provides an overview of both international law 
and the concepts needed for its economic analysis. Most significantly, chapter 3 offers a 
succinct and accessible summary of the building blocks required to understand the 
substantive chapters that follow. It makes clear the central assumption at the heart of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea, 104 AJIL 569 
(2010); Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 103 (2011); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science 
Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AJIL 47 (2012); Andrew Guzman, 
International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 999 (2013).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2402695 
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economic analysis of the law, namely that “individuals act in their rational self-interest” 
(p. 12). Quite appropriately, Posner and Sykes make little effort to defend this 
methodological choice beyond acknowledging that it is a simplifying assumption. 
Different methodologies are useful for answering different questions, and any 
generalizable approach has to abstract away from detail to generate meaningful 
predictions about how states will behave across a range of circumstances. The chapter 
also introduces the concepts of externalities, public goods, and collective-action problems 
and applies them to international law. In short, cross-border externalities create the 
demand for international law. Put in noneconomic terms, actions taken in one state often 
affect other states, but those cross-border effects are not reflected in the actor’s decision-
making process. International law is one tool that states use to control such cross-border 
externalities. Using international law for this task is complicated by the lack of a 
centralized enforcement mechanism, but, as Posner and Sykes explain, the literature has 
identified a number of decentralized mechanisms—including reputation, reciprocal 
noncompliance, and retaliation—that create costs for breaching international law 
obligations. 
 
Part II (chapters 4–10), entitled “General Aspects of International Law,” develops 
the economic analysis of the background institutions of international law. Thus, this part 
has chapters on sovereignty and statehood (chapter 4), customary international law 
(chapter 5), treaties (chapter 6), international institutions (chapter 7), state responsibility 
(chapter 8), remedies (chapter 9), and the relationship between international and domestic 
law (chapter 10). There is much to admire in the authors’ treatment of these subjects, and 
much could be said about each. For the sake of brevity, I focus on the authors’ treatment 
of international lawmaking, both customary international law and international law as 
made by international institutions. In brief, Economic Foundations provides a very 
valuable starting point for thinking about how the behavioral assumptions of economic 
analysis explain patterns of international lawmaking. The authors do an excellent job of 
detailing how and why states made (or did not make) different kinds of international law 
throughout much of the twentieth century. At the same time, international lawmaking has 
changed dramatically in recent decades. Economic analysis is a powerful tool to explain 
these new patterns of lawmaking as well.  
 
For example, the fate of customary international law as a category of legal norms, 
currently being debated by the International Law Commission,2 is a key question facing 
international law in the twenty-first century. Posner and Sykes offer a compelling account 
of how customary international law emerges—through a common-law-like process of 
resolving similar disputes among small numbers of states (often only two) in a similar 
fashion. Consequently, prior disputes become precedents that states can use as bases to 
resolve current disagreements.  
                                                 
2 See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/653 (May 30, 2012); Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government 
Officials and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 108 AJIL ___, 
___ (2014). 
.  
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This account—which, in keeping with traditional international legal scholarship, 
treats custom as qualitatively different from treaties—has a great deal of purchase in 
describing how customary international law has historically emerged. One might wonder, 
though, how different modern customary international law really is from treaty law in 
terms of how the former develops and evolves. On the one hand, many international 
treaties, including most multilateral agreements, are very vague, just as Posner and Sykes 
note that customary international law can be. These vague treaty provisions are often 
given content through the subsequent practice of states in applying the treaty provisions. 
Indeed, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly directs a treaty 
interpreter to look at such state practice.3 On the other hand, since at least the middle of 
the twentieth century, both treaties and international institutions have played major roles 
in defining customary international law obligations. Treaties frequently codify, and 
therefore help define, customary international law obligations, while resolutions passed 
by the UN General Assembly or draft articles produced by the International Law 
Commission are regularly cited as evidence of customary international law.4 These forms 
of precedent differ fundamentally from the largely bilateral disputes described by Posner 
and Sykes. While described as customary international law, such precedent is often the 
product of multilateral negotiations and reflects a prospective declaration of what the law 
is or should be, rather than a retrospective assessment of the existence of a general, 
consistent state practice done out of a sense of legal obligation.5 
 
Similarly, chapter 7 raises interesting questions about the lawmaking role of 
international institutions. Posner and Sykes take the conventional view that international 
institutions should be analyzed as delegations of authority from states. Such delegations 
“can be legislative, executive, or judicial” (p. 80). The authors compare international 
delegations with delegations of lawmaking authority from the U.S. Congress to 
administrative agencies, but they argue that international delegations are exceedingly 
rare. For example, the authors claim that legislative delegation—by which they seem to 
mean the ability of an international institution to make binding law directly without any 
intervening act, such as ratification, by states (p. 81)—is virtually nonexistent outside of 
the UN Security Council and the institutions of the European Union. Similarly, Posner 
and Sykes argue that “[j]udicial delegation at the international level is also extremely 
rare,” (p. 81) although much of the chapter is spent describing the many international 
courts and quasi-adjudicative committees that exist despite the lack of binding authority. 
                                                 
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (stating that a 
treaty interpreter shall examine “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Monica Hakimi, 
Law and the Universal Human Rights Treaties, Duke-Geneva Conference on the Role of Opinio Juris in 
Customary International Law (2013) (on file with author) (arguing that the Vienna Convention’s state 
practice requirement  for treaty interpretation is similar to customary international law’s state practice 
requirement). 
4 See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session 43,UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001).  
5 See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AJIL 529, 543–48 (1993).  
 4
 
Posner and Sykes’ central insight—that international institutions should be 
analyzed differently depending on the functions that they perform—is of critical 
significance. Scholarship on international organizations often does not sufficiently 
distinguish among different kinds of international institutions. At the same time, a narrow 
analytical framework that focuses on whether institutions may directly enact binding law 
can unduly limit the potential for scholarly inquiry.  International institutions vary 
considerably in terms of their aims and how they function and thus, not surprisingly, in 
how they are organized. The tools of economic analysis, including new institutional 
economics, may fruitfully be applied to greatly expand our understanding of the variation 
in how international institutions are structured, in how their internal governance 
procedures operate, and in how they relate to each other.6  
 
Take the example of international legislative bodies. Posner and Sykes are, of 
course, correct that states empower few such bodies to enact binding law directly.7 A 
slightly broader definition of a legislature reveals a very different picture, however. One 
might define an international legislature as a body in which states make collective 
decisions about the kinds of obligations, binding or not, that members of the group may 
make. 8  This definition does not preclude an institution from being considered a 
legislature merely because its acts must be individually ratified by states to be binding. 
Rather, it focuses on whether state A has a legal right to participate in, and possibly 
prevent, the formation of obligations by states B and C within a particular forum. 
National legislatures function in this way, at least in part. For example, two U.S. states 
may not make legal commitments to each other on their own. Instead, they must seek 
either national legislation to deal with the issue or the permission of the U.S. Congress to 
enter into a compact.9 In either case, all other states, through their representatives in 
Congress, have the chance to say yes or no to the proposed law, even if it does not affect 
them.  
 
Conceived of this way, there are dozens of international legislatures. The UN 
Security Council and General Assembly, which Posner and Sykes discuss, are perhaps 
the most obvious illustrations, but the conference of the parties (COP) to any multilateral 
treaty would qualify: the COP to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 36 (1999) (discussing the theory of the firm’s applicability to international organizations); 
Timothy Meyer, Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic Cooperation in International Environmental 
Governance, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 15 (2013) (applying the concept of asset specificity to explain 
whether technical and expert bodies should be integrated into, or independent of, international lawmaking 
bodies).  
7 In addition to the Security Council and the European Union, treaties such as the Montreal Protocol permit 
some binding technical changes to be made by a vote of the Parties. Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 2.9, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 UNTS 3, 26 
ILM 1550 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual International 
Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71 (discussing examples of nonunanimous lawmaking).  
8 Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern International Lawmaking, 14 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 559, 569–70 (2014). 
9 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §10. 
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Change, the Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC Statute), the COP to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
and the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to name only a 
few. These institutions are organized like legislatures, often dividing their work into 
committees and “adopting” legislative acts through either consensus or various voting 
rules. The process of “adoption,” in which an international legislature approves an 
instrument for possible ratification by its parties, is critical, even though it does not 
directly result in binding legal obligations. 10  The process of adopting a draft legal 
instrument permits dissenting member states to influence the obligations that 
cooperation-minded member states make to each other. By refusing to permit a COP to 
adopt a draft legal instrument, dissenters can prevent international lawmaking from 
proceeding. Defining the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute illustrates the point. 
Adopting the aggression amendments within the Assembly of the Parties, as was done at 
Kampala in 2010, required consensus in practice. This voting rule meant that states 
favoring a weaker definition of the crime of aggression were necessary if the aggression 
amendments were to be adopted at all. These states were thus able to extract concessions 
weakening the aggression amendments, despite the fact that some of these states likely 
have no intention of ever ratifying the aggression amendments.11 
 
Applying economic analysis to the internal organization and to the rules of these 
international legislatures promises to advance considerably our explanations of modern 
international lawmaking. The classic “delegation” paradigm that Posner and Sykes use as 
their overarching model of international organizations does not adequately capture the 
dynamics at work in international legislatures. International legislatures are not 
delegations of the kind suggested by the comparison to the relationship between the U.S. 
Congress and administrative agencies or courts. They also do not exist to reduce the 
burden on lawmaking imposed by the requirement that states consent to their own legal 
obligations.12 International legislatures usually retain the requirement that states consent 
through ratification to their own binding legal commitments, while also adding an 
additional requirement: that the legislature as a whole adopt the legal instrument before 
any subset of member states may ratify it.  
 
International legislatures are thus an alternative way of structuring interstate 
negotiations. Legal obligations can be negotiated contractually, without institutional 
structures and rules, as many bilateral treaties are negotiated. Alternatively, they can be 
negotiated in legislative bodies, with permanent memberships and procedural rules. 
                                                 
10 Vienna Convention, supra note 3, Art. 9. 
11 Beth Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The Crime of Aggression, 49 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 518–21 (2011). 
12 Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 253 (2013) 
(“There will be increased demand both for more international law and for more international organizational 
capacity to provide mechanisms for legislative or decision-making action”); Andrew T. Guzman, Against 
Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 763 (2012) (“An excessive commitment to consent can cripple efforts to 
use international law as a tool to help solve the world’s largest problems.”); see also Geoffrey Palmer, New 
Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AJIL 259, 279 (1992) (describing an international 
legislature for environmental law capable of binding states).  
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Organizing the negotiation of legal obligations through legislatures creates holdup 
power.13 As with the Kampala negotiations, the legislature’s procedural rules give some 
states veto power over the entire institution’s ability to act. A state (or a small group of 
states)—including a state with no intention of ratifying the act of a COP—may thus 
prevent cooperation-minded states from using existing international institutions to adopt 
legal instruments among themselves.14  
 
Using institutions to create additional holdup power is puzzling, given that 
international lawmaking is already bedeviled by the requirement that states consent to 
their own legal obligations. New institutional economics, however, suggests that this kind 
of holdup power lubricates negotiations. It does so by making enforceable “vote-trading” 
agreements in which states agree to make concessions to each other across issues not 
under simultaneous negotiation.15 For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership16  (TPP) 
consists of a variety of “chapters” negotiated sequentially. Each chapter could be adopted 
as an individual treaty. Instead, the diplomatic conference negotiating the TPP will adopt 
(or not adopt) the entire package as a single undertaking.17 This procedure means that a 
state that makes concessions on the terms contained in one chapter with the expectation 
of receiving concessions in a later-negotiated chapter can prevent the adoption of the 
entire agreement if states do not honor the agreed-upon exchange of concessions. By 
contrast, if states adopted chapters as they negotiated them, a state making a concession 
in earlier chapters would have no assurances that the concessions that it expects to 
receive in later chapters would actually materialize. States might be reluctant, therefore, 
to make concessions in the first place.18 Adoption procedures and the holdup power that 
they create thus actually reduce the transaction costs of iterative negotiations.   
 
Having built out the framework for analyzing international law in general, part III 
(“Traditional Public International Law” (chapters 11–15)), part IV (“The Environment” 
(chapters 16–17)), and part V (“International Economic Law” (chapters 18–19)) analyze 
substantive areas of international law. These three parts are especially valuable for the 
                                                 
13 See Meyer, supra note 8, at 564; Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization 
of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 
(1988). 
14 Nor can cooperation-minded states costlessly step outside of a COP to enter into the same agreement 
among themselves. Modern international institutions are usually continuing bodies that develop law over 
time. If a subsequent instrument is not made by the legislative body governing the institution, it may not be 
related to the governing instrument and therefore may lose much of its value. For example, if a trade 
agreement is adopted outside of the WTO, the WTO’s already well-developed dispute settlement process 
will not be available to resolve disputes under that agreement. Similarly, if the crime of aggression had 
been defined by a treaty only among states favoring a strong definition of aggression (and therefore outside 
of the Assembly of the Parties to the ICC), the ICC would not have been able to prosecute the crime as 
defined. In the environmental context, decisions by COPs, such as the COP to the Stockholm Convention, 
to subject certain chemicals to the Convention’s controls reduce transaction costs by relating a very narrow 
decision—the control of a particular chemical—to an already existing legal framework. 
15 Meyer, supra note 8, at 591. 
16 At http://www.ustr.gov/tpp. 
17 See Deborah Elms, Getting the Trans-Pacific Partnership over the Finish Line, NBR ANALYSIS BRIEF 
(Oct. 22, 2012), available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/brief/102212_Elms_TPP.pdf. 
18 See Meyer, supra note 9, at 594.  
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amount of ground that they cover and, true to the authors’ intent, provide an incredibly 
useful reference for scholars interested in the economic analysis of a wide range of 
international legal topics. The topics covered include the treatment of aliens, foreign 
property, and foreign debt (chapter 11), the use of force (chapter 12), the conduct of war 
(chapter 13), human rights (chapter 14), international criminal law (chapters 15), 
international environmental law (chapter 16), the law of the sea (chapter 17), 
international trade (chapter 18), and international investment law (chapter 19). In each 
chapter, the authors identify the core economic rationale for the law or the economic 
puzzle in the law, and they also critique the law where it does not seem justifiable on 
economic grounds.  
 
Chapter 14 on human rights provides an illustrative example. As Posner and 
Sykes describe the conundrum, in most areas of international law a “treaty sets out a quid 
pro quo—each party incurs an obligation that benefits the other party . . . . Human rights 
treaties do not seem to fit this model” (p. 202). Instead, Posner and Sykes argue that, in 
entering into human rights treaties, “Western liberal states that set the agenda believed 
that they would not have to change their behavior. In their view, they already respected 
human rights. The idea of the treaty regime was to compel other states . . . to do the 
same” (id.). The puzzle, in the authors’ view, is why other states agreed, given that liberal 
democracies were not offering any concessions in the agreement itself.  
 
Posner and Sykes present a creative explanation of this puzzle. States with 
troubling human rights practices join and comply (when they do) with human rights 
treaties in exchange for side payments of various kinds, as a signaling device to foreign 
and domestic constituencies and as a means to avoid sanctions from liberal democracies. 
But the real value in human rights treaties, Posner and Sykes argue, is that they solve a 
collective action problem among liberal democracies. Poor human rights practices in 
other countries create a kind of externality in the sense that liberal democracies suffer 
disutility from poor human rights practices in other countries. Improving human rights 
practices is thus “a ‘good’ for which they have preferences (for which they are willing to 
pay)” (p. 203). Moreover, liberal democracies are likely to have overlapping preferences 
for good human rights practices; the United States and European nations all prefer, for 
example, that genocide not occur. These overlapping preferences create a collective 
action problem. Although each state would like to encourage human rights violators to 
improve their practices, it fails to internalize the entire benefit of its efforts. Therefore, it 
will attempt to “free ride” on the efforts of other countries to improve human rights 
practices, generating inefficiently low sanctions for human rights violators. Human rights 
treaties arguably help solve this problem by coordinating sanctioning efforts among 
liberal democracies. To the extent that this coordination is ineffective, it may be because 
“liberal countries rarely have a strong interest in improving well-being in other countries” 
(p. 206), rather than because the mechanism itself does not work. 
 
This explanation has the great virtue of explaining why human rights treaties may 
not be that different from many other kinds of international agreements. The United 
States, for instance, has long used international law to export U.S. regulatory regimes in 
fields other than human rights. The Montreal Protocol, which followed domestic U.S. 
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regulation of ozone-depleting substances, and the anticorruption conventions of the 
United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
which followed the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,19 are two prominent 
examples where the United States regulated a problem domestically first and then pushed 
for an international agreement. In both cases, the United States accepted few new 
obligations in the corresponding international agreements, precisely because these 
agreements were based on U.S. domestic standards. Other countries still joined, however, 
perhaps in part because of how the international treaties coordinated sanctions.20  
 
Other chapters in parts III, IV, and V of the book highlight situations where 
economic analysis has already made significant inroads into international law and where 
it holds promise for considerably greater gains. Part V, on international economic law, is 
the most detailed section, comprising two chapters and sixty-six pages.  This length 
reflects the fact that international economic law is the field in which economic analysis of 
international law began and in which it has its greatest synergies. In contrast, chapter 16 
on international environmental law is a brief eight pages. Although some very excellent 
economic analyses of international environmental law exist,21 the brevity of this chapter 
underscores the opportunities available for future economic analysis. For example, many 
international environmental regimes contain trade rules aimed at reducing trade-based 
environmental externalities. These regimes—the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species, the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent, the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to name only a 
few—are susceptible to economic analysis in a fashion similar to trade and investment 
law.  
 
No single review can do justice to the breadth of material and ideas covered in 
Economic Foundations of International Law. The book should be required reading for the 
serious scholar of international law, whether or not engaging in economic analysis. In a 
book with such a wide scope, no doubt any reader will find something with which to 
disagree. But such disagreements should not take away from Posner and Sykes’s 
achievement. Economic Foundations consolidates the gains and insights made in the 
economic analysis of international law to date and sets the stage moving forward.  
 
 
                                                 
19 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1 et seq. 
20 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, Art. 4 (requiring parties to the Montreal Protocol to impose trade 
sanctions on nonparties not in substantive compliance with the treaty’s terms). 
21 See, e.g., SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT & STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-
MAKING (2003). 
